What's wrong with US-proposed "peace plans"

From an interview of Ukrainian diplomat Oleh Shamshur in the Obozrevatel:

"The amended plan, slapped with spaghetti on the Ukrainians' ears, remained a reward for Putin. Why a personal meeting between Zelensky and Trump won't change anything

27.12.2025  

- For the first time, the Ukrainian President has officially announced 20 points of the so-called peace plan. Some observers believe this is a definite positive shift for Ukraine, given what we started with several weeks ago. Others, however, say that the statement that, theoretically, we could somehow retain control of the part of Donbas is essentially a reduction in our "red lines." What do you think we have today?

Looking at the philosophy of this document, there are two key points. First, it's a process of "improving on a bad thing." That is, if we look at what has become known and what has been approved by the president, we see that there have indeed been some changes, and some formulations have disappeared. In particular, it's striking that the detailed plan for building a "beautiful future" between the US and Russia—with its economic and political reintegration—has disappeared. But we understand perfectly well that this will in no way prevent such scenarios from being implemented bilaterally. And Ukraine doesn't need any consent for this, not even formal.  

Secondly, the document's philosophy from the very beginning, ever since Trump's initiatives emerged and were first discussed, has been a plan to reward Russia for its aggression. And, accordingly, this entails a series of extremely painful, existential concessions on Ukraine's part. In this sense, nothing has changed. And, unfortunately, it is precisely on this basis that the United States is prepared to negotiate. And, in fact, the Europeans also agree with this, despite occasional statements to the contrary.

Even if we imagine the best-case scenario, a hypothetical "freeze"—and right now it looks like a freeze of the situation on the demarcation line—this would amount to a territorial division of Ukraine with very dim prospects for a return...

- Regarding security guarantees, the Ukrainian President and the head of the negotiating team, Rustem Umerov, have been making some fairly positive statements lately. They say the Americans understand us, are accommodating, and perhaps something will even be approved by Congress. But what do we actually have, it's hard to understand, other than the fact that the first shot from Ukraine destroys all guarantees?

For this document to have any value, it needed to clearly spell out the guarantees. Previously, the logic was that partners would provide Ukraine with security guarantees, or at least discuss them. Now it turns out that these guarantees must also be approved by Russia. And even as they are currently written, they are not spelled out at all...

The document's overall philosophy only heightens doubts about the United States' readiness to assume a genuine leadership role in Ukraine's defense, despite all the US President's statements. If all of this is once again made contingent on Russia's consent, this, firstly, opens the door for Russia to torpedo both the agreement itself and the ceasefire.

Let's be frank: we need a ceasefire. What kind of "territorial agreement" could there possibly be with the Russians? It's absurd. So yes, I have serious reservations about the philosophy of this document, especially about the security guarantees. They must be concrete and backed by commitments from the US and Europeans now – before or alongside the signing of any agreements. If that doesn't happen, everything will again boil down to "assurances." And we already know what these "assurances" look like. It's the same old "spaghetti on the ears."  

- It looks like Trump and his representatives need the war to end as soon as possible. And what happens next, in a few months, seems to be of no interest to them at all.

This is essentially Trump's method. He needs to end the war, report to the world, and most importantly, to his own electorate, that "the job is done." If you look at all his previous mediation initiatives in other conflicts, the logic is the same. The ceasefire lasts a few days, and then problems arise that were clear from the start. After that, he'll tell everyone that he's already helped conclude nine agreements, and he'll once again demand the Nobel Peace Prize. It sounds ridiculous, but for Trump, this is truly an extremely important issue. This is precisely why Witkoff and Kushner were brought in at this stage: to push through this deal, to push through the way their boss, Donald Trump, sees it...

- We can discuss individual points as much as we want now, but the entire structure, thanks to Trump, is designed in such a way that everything depends on Russia's consent. And Moscow has already said: yes, we are ready to work with this document, but only as a basis for starting negotiations.

Until Russia is stopped through concerted efforts—sanctions, weapons, and pressure—Putin will try to dictate his will and his vision of the agreements. A ceasefire will only be possible under conditions acceptable to him. Incidentally, this must be discussed frankly with the public. Instead of talking about some kind of "progress," "consensus," or "if it's not good, it's not so bad." We must state frankly: under any circumstances, this scenario is bad for Ukraine. And everyone must prepare for a future continuation of the war. Avoid saying this just because Trump or his envoys might dislike it; this is the very issue of real sovereignty that is so pompously outlined in the first paragraph of the document..."