Russia keeps attacking and grabbing land in cycles, and is rewarded for it

From the Obozrevatel, 12.12.2025, by Olexander Levi-Ganapolsky:

"...There are two competing "peace" projects.

On one side is the American-Russian line: Ukraine cedes additional territory in the east, agrees to restrictions on its military, and postpones NATO membership. In exchange, Moscow makes vague promises not to attack again, and Washington gets the opportunity to declare that it "ended the war." Ukrainian land is viewed as a problematic asset, and NATO's future is turned into a bargaining chip. The formula is repeated time and again: move the borders on the map, sign the papers, and call it a "painful but necessary compromise."

On the other hand, there's the Ukrainian-European line: there's one aggressor and one victim. If the aggressor ultimately officially becomes larger and the victim smaller, the problem isn't solved; it merely demonstrates that aggression is an acceptable and profitable diplomatic model. For Central and Eastern Europe, this isn't just a theory. Throughout the 20th century, they've observed the same cycle: Russia attacks, bites off territory, freezes the situation, waits for the world to put up with it, and then repeats the process all over again. For them, consolidating Russia's gains is a down payment on the next war.  

There's also the issue of scale, which Washington prefers to ignore. Russia still has nuclear weapons and a large army; economically, it's a medium-sized country, dependent on oil and gas. Its influence has long relied almost entirely on a single resource: energy exports to Europe. By comparison, the economies of Guangdong and Jiangsu alone in China are each worth close to two trillion dollars; if they were separate states, they would rank among the world's largest economies. Meanwhile, Trump is effectively proposing to halt NATO expansion and rewrite the European security architecture for a country whose economic weight is comparable to that of a single Chinese coastal province, and then reward that country with additional territory. 

 This logic doesn't end with Europe—it directly applies to Taiwan. 

Taiwan's position is more vulnerable than Ukraine's in at least two ways. It lacks a land border equivalent to the European Union; it's an island, dependent on sea routes and air corridors. Its adversary isn't a declining raw materials power, but the world's second-largest economy and the United States' main systemic rival. Today, Washington and Tokyo are making confident statements: Taiwan will not be left alone. Ukraine has been described for years with very similar formulas. But when the real test began, aid arrived late, was fragmented, and severely limited. 

Beijing is watching the war in Ukraine as a living textbook. The lesson here is not only military but also political. If Russia can invade its neighbor, commit war crimes, survive sanctions, and ultimately obtain a Western-approved map that cements its territorial conquest, then China's path becomes clear: start a war, dig in its troops, endure several brutal years, wait for Washington and other capitals to tire—and then agree to a "historical compromise," in which the victim will be told to be "realistic" and accept reduced borders because it supposedly "has no cards in its hand" to continue the struggle..."