The Institute for the Study of War contradicts Trump about the alleged concession by Russia to not take all of Ukraine:
"Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 25, 2025
...That the Kremlin is not formally demanding that Ukraine cede most or all of its territory to Russia at this time is not a significant Russian concession, however. The initial full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine aimed to seize Kyiv in February and March 2022 in order to force Ukraine to capitulate fully, depose the current Ukrainian government, and disarm the Ukrainian military, amounting to the total defeat of Ukraine. Russia failed to achieve this objective because the Ukrainian military, with limited Western support, defeated the Russian attack on Kyiv and stalled Russian offensives in the east and south. Ukrainian forces forced Russian forces to withdraw from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy oblasts in early April 2022 and from most of Kharkiv Oblast and all of west-bank Kherson Oblast later in 2022.[16] Russian forces remain unable to launch an offensive operation that could seize Kyiv or recross the Dnipro River in southern Ukraine at this time, and spent 2024 fighting desperately to seize an area nine-tenths the size of Rhode Island. Russia does not have the military power to seize the rest of Ukraine absent a full-scale mobilization of Russian society, and possibly not then, as long as Western support to Ukraine continues.
The Kremlin has not abandoned its maximalist objectives, moreover. Kremlin mouthpieces, including Russian Security Council Secretary Dmitry Medvedev, have laid the rhetorical groundwork for Russia to eventually lay claim to most or all of Ukraine.[17] Russian officials have also doubled down on their demands for regime change in Ukraine and rhetoric intended to undermine the legitimacy of the current Ukrainian government as recently as April 24.[18] Both of these efforts in concert indicate that Putin retains his objective of controlling all of Ukraine, but is limited by Russia's inability to achieve this objective militarily.
Russian officials continue to intensify narratives used to justify Russia's invasion of Ukraine in order to set conditions to justify future Russian aggression against European states and control European defense policy in the Kremlin's reflexive control campaign. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) published a report on April 25 entitled "80 Years After the Great Victory: The Shadow of Nazism Has Again Covered Europe," which accuses European states and officials of reviving Nazi ideology and creating policies that discriminate against Russian-speaking populations, especially in Lithuania, Lativa, and Estonia.[19] Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova amplified this report and claimed that European states are preventing Russia from achieving its long-held objectives of demilitarization and "denazification" of Ukraine due to this alleged support of Naziism.[20] Russian officials regularly invoke "denazification" to call for regime change in Ukraine and the installation of a pro-Russian puppet government.[21] Zakharova specifically accused the Baltic States and Poland of justifying and reviving Nazism.
Russian officials have notably leveraged accusations of neo-Nazi ideology to justify Russia's invasions of Ukraine, and Russian officials leveraging these narratives against European states - especially the Baltics and Poland - supports ISW's assessment that Russia may be setting informational conditions to justify future aggression against these states as well.[22] Russian officials are likely attempting to discredit European states more broadly in order to deter them from providing further assistance to Ukraine and revitalizing their defense industries in order to set conditions for future Russian aggression against a weakened Europe.[23]
[16] https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20April%203.pdf
[17] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-18-2025; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-december-13-2023; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-22-2024; https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-4-2024;
[18] https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-24-2025; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-7-2025; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011125 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar011425; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041825; https://isw.pub/UkrWar040725; https://isw.pub/UkrWar122624
[19] https://mid dot ru/ru/activity/ko-dny-pobedy/2011501/?lang=ru ; https://t.me/MID_Russia/56232
[20] https://t.me/MID_Russia/56233
[21] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525
[22] https://isw.pub/UkrWar042425 ; https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-24-2025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar042025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar04172025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar041025 ; https://isw.pub/UkrWar031325
[23] https://isw.pub/UkrWar041525"
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