From UNIAN:
""The IAEA's right-hand man is a co-organizer of the Zaporizhzhya NPP occupation! There can be no talk of its operation under Russian control," says nuclear expert Vande Putte.
17.10.2025
Leading nuclear safety expert Jan Vande Putte spoke to UNIAN about the main risks at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, the hidden danger created by the occupiers at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, the real reason behind the IAEA's hypocrisy, and what else Western partners should do to protect the world from Russia.
Ukrainian nuclear power plants are under constant threat due to the reckless and irresponsible actions of the Russians. This applies not only to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, which lost power from the grid on September 23 and switched to diesel generators because the occupiers want to reconnect it to their power grid, nor to the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant, where the Russians continue to create dangerous situations threatening radiation leaks. This also applies to all operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine, which the aggressor periodically threatens to attack. Meanwhile, the weak response of international partners, who continue to cooperate with Russia's Rosatom, and especially the inaction of the IAEA, which almost directly supports the Kremlin, legitimizing its disinformation, gives the occupier free rein.
Jan Vande Putte, a leading radiation safety expert and nuclear energy expert at Greenpeace Ukraine who has extensively researched the situation in Ukraine, laid out all the risks and dangers posed by the occupiers at domestic nuclear power plants in a comprehensive, exclusive interview with UNIAN. The Belgian researcher discussed the current state of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP), the potential and conditions under which a serious nuclear disaster could occur there, how the occupiers damaged the new confinement at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Chernobyl), and why this problem is much more serious than it might initially appear, what would happen if Russia dared to attack key substations at Ukrainian NPPs, and how the international community continues to support the Kremlin. Furthermore, the expert shared his vision for how Ukraine's energy sector should be restored to ensure that our country becomes a powerful energy hub for all of Europe.
His experience and expertise are especially valuable, as Jan Vande Putte has been with Greenpeace for nearly 30 years and leads the radiation protection group in various parts of the world. He worked at Fukushima in the first days after the 2011 disaster and carried out radiation monitoring in India. He visited Chernobyl in July 2022, witnessed the consequences of the Russian occupation firsthand, and continues to study them. He also researches the Russian occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant...
- In Ukraine, you're specifically investigating the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. How would you describe its current state? Especially considering that the plant lost power from the grid on September 23.
Russia attacked and occupied the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant on March 3-4, 2022. Since then, the plant has been in a state of disarray. Many qualified employees have left. There's a shortage of staff. They've hired new employees who don't have the necessary qualifications. Therefore, the Zaporizhzhia NPP is experiencing a general maintenance crisis and staff incompetence. The situation is unstable. This is very important.
Since September 2022, all reactors have been shut down – the fuel in the reactor core has begun to decay, producing less heat. This is an important part of the story, because a single operating reactor produces a huge amount of energy – approximately 3,000 megawatts of thermal power. That's equivalent to 3 million electric kettles!
If you lose all cooling at this point, then within hours all the water will evaporate, the fuel will be exposed, and will begin to melt. Then a major nuclear accident could occur. That's why nuclear power plants have many backup systems.
If there's no grid power, what we call a loss of external power (which is what's currently happening in Zaporizhzhia), diesel generators are activated to keep the cooling pumps and everything else running. But in the case of the Zaporizhzhia NPP, this is under a much more stable condition, after three years of fuel cooling. While at an operating nuclear power plant we're talking about hours before a fuel meltdown, in the current situation it's anywhere from two weeks to well over a month.
I'm giving such a broad range because there are six reactors at Zaporizhzhya NPP, and each reactor building contains two major sources of radioactivity: the core and the pool containing old spent fuel that has already been removed from the reactor. Therefore, each of them has slightly different characteristics. There's no specific figure. But it's at least two weeks.
In this sense, we can still classify this situation as serious. But it's not urgent. And, of course, the technical problem is, in a sense, a trap. Most importantly, it's essentially a political issue.
- Is there anything international organizations, particularly the IAEA, can do in this situation to influence the aggressor? Because we understand that the Russians are using the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant as a tool for nuclear blackmail against the entire world.
Exactly. This is the entire political context. Looking at the situation only from a technical perspective, you can completely miss the point. The loss of power was not caused by shelling from Ukraine, as Russia claims. We can prove that this is all disinformation and sabotage.
There's probably some damage (to the power line that fed the station - UNIAN), but it's limited. This means Russia can repair this line in a matter of hours, perhaps a day, perhaps two days at most. It's almost as if they have a switch. If they want to restart the system, if there's a real crisis, if all those diesel generators are no longer working, then they can still repair everything very quickly. Even that's not a problem.
They say we can't go there because Ukraine is shelling the area. And we can prove that's not true. But the IAEA is acting so surreal that it seems reality no longer matters. We prove everything with satellite images—they're not faked, they can be verified. And yet the IAEA still talks about a problem from both sides.
Therefore, the IAEA's problem isn't just that they're supporting Russian disinformation, but that they're also jeopardizing the situation by supporting Russia in keeping this nuclear power plant without external power. Why won't the IAEA tell the Russians to repair the line?
- And indeed, why? What do you think is the real motive behind their position?
Because they're biased. The first thing we did as Greenpeace after the full-scale invasion was write a letter to Mr. Grossi, saying: "Your deputy, the IAEA's right-hand man, is Mr. Chudakov. He's a former Rosatom employee and a co-organizer of the occupation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant. So, your organization is headed by a Russian agent. Please remove him from office." That's how our discussion about the IAEA began.
Our assessment is based on two things. First, Russia is the world's most important exporter of nuclear technology. And the IAEA's formal function is to promote nuclear energy globally. So the connection is obvious. But more fundamentally, Mr. Grossi has ambitions to become the next Secretary-General of the United Nations. And to do so, he needs Russia's support. And Putin has backed him, which is a definite conflict of interest.
- As you've already said, many politicians are involved in this issue.
Exactly. But what's important for Ukraine, and what matters to us as the environmental organization Greenpeace, is that because of this policy, the IAEA is essentially supporting Russia, supporting this risk. This is 100% contrary to their mandate. And this must be stopped.
- Speaking about the current blackout at the Zaporizhzhya NPP, some Ukrainian experts compared the situation to what happened at Fukushima. As someone who personally investigated the nuclear disaster in Japan, how do you feel about such comparisons?
I've already explained the difference between an operating nuclear reactor producing enormous amounts of heat and one that has been shut down for three years. Of course, it's a huge difference, and it's sparked a lot of discussion, as we've seen. The fact that the reactors and fuel have cooled for a long period of time doesn't mean a serious nuclear accident is technically impossible today. However, it seems like a process unfolding in slow motion. Of course, there are many things a nuclear power plant operator could do under normal circumstances to prevent this, but there's no normal operator there. This is a rogue operator. And we don't know what Russia's intentions are.
This could still be a significant difference from Fukushima, as there were short-lived isotopes there, such as iodine-131, which causes problems for the thyroid gland. This was well known in Ukraine after Chernobyl in 1986. So, there's practically no iodine left there (behind the Zaporizhzhia NPP, - UNIAN). This is a fundamental difference.
In the worst-case scenario, if the Russians do something to the station, a large amount of radiation could still be released in a different form of contamination. But then again, we're still weeks or months away from that.
- We understand that until the Zaporizhzhya NPP is returned to Ukrainian control, it will still not be safe. This is especially true given the occupiers' desire to re-energize and restart the plant from their power grid, while Russian engineers are unaware of how to handle this type of reactor and equipment. What scenarios do you envisage for returning the plant to Ukraine?
This is certainly a long-term discussion. In fact, Greenpeace published a report on March 2, 2022, just one or two days before the attack on the occupied territory, which envisaged this scenario. After that, we declared that Russia must leave the nuclear power plant without any alternatives, that Ukraine's legitimate nuclear safety authority, the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate, must regain control of the Zaporizhzhya NPP, and that Ukrainian workers familiar with the facility must return to their positions.
This isn't enough. It may sound radical, but Ukraine's victory is the only factor that can restore this reactor to a state where it can be operated by Ukraine. It's not that we're supporters of nuclear energy. Greenpeace is critical of it. But now we find ourselves in a situation where we must say: no resuming operation of a nuclear reactor under Russian control! This is priority number one. Russia must leave Ukraine. Ukraine's power grid as a whole must become stable again. This is also important for other operating nuclear power plants in Ukraine: in Rivne, Khmelnytskyi, and Yuzhnoukrainsk.
- Turning to Ukraine's existing nuclear power plants, what threats exist for them?
Despite Greenpeace's critical stance toward nuclear energy, Ukraine is now heavily dependent on it, due to the destruction of many other energy facilities: hydroelectric power plants, coal-fired power plants, and gas-fired power plants. Therefore, Ukraine has become increasingly dependent on these three nuclear power plants. But this in itself is a huge problem, as the energy sector must be considered as a unified system.
If one of these nuclear power plants were to lose power, a shock wave would ripple through the grid, potentially destabilizing the power grid enough to trigger a true blackout. What we call a technical blackout isn't what happened in Ukraine. A true blackout is what we recently saw in Spain. It's an uncontrollable situation that halts all electricity production and complicates grid restoration, which can take a very long time. Therefore, their high reliance on these three nuclear power plants also makes them highly vulnerable. If one of them is shut down due to a military attack on a key substation in the power grid, it could, say, trigger a chain reaction and cause a massive power outage in Ukraine. Then, the existing nuclear power plants would become dependent on diesel generators, but with extremely hot reactor cores. We would then find ourselves in a truly dangerous situation, very different from what we have today at the Zaporizhzhia NPP. This is a real problem.
- And what could be the consequences in this case?
Of course, other nuclear power plants also have diesel generators with backup power and fuel storage. We know that Ukrenergo is a hero, doing incredible things we never thought possible. But if the power outage continues for a long time (we hope it won't), the most important thing will be a speedy restoration. The problem is that you can't restore the grid to restart it.
Restarting the grid requires energy. If a nuclear power plant can't do this, a hydroelectric power plant, a coal-fired power plant, or a gas-fired power plant is needed. And since many of these have been destroyed, this too becomes a problem. This is where the risk of a systemic power outage in Ukraine lies. And we must avoid this at all costs. This is why we, at Greenpeace, are pressing the international community so hard to force Russia to stop its attacks on critical infrastructure, on seven critical substations in Ukraine.
- What are you doing, as Greenpeace, to prevent such scenarios and put pressure on Russia? What do you expect from the international community, what actions are you organizing, and what else can be done to increase leverage over the aggressor?
Directly, it doesn't matter what we say. But there are other ways to exert pressure. You see, Russia is the world's leading exporter of nuclear technology. Their image in the world, especially in the Global South, is very strong. If they screw up here, and it is perceived as their responsibility, it will be catastrophic for Rosatom's business worldwide.
It's not even about money here. It's about political influence. They tie governments down and make them dependent, even if it costs them money. They buy them politically. For Russia, this is strategically important. And they are very sensitive to the possibility of being perceived as responsible for creating a nuclear catastrophe. That's where we have leverage.
We're talking about every Russian false-flag operation, like the recent attack on a 750-kilovolt power line near Zaporizhzhia (which resulted in the Zaporizhzhia NPP losing power, - UNIAN). This needs to be exposed. Exposing disinformation is crucial because we need to ensure Russia doesn't escape accountability for its lies. This is one way we're working to do that.
The next step is pressure on Mr. Grossi and the IAEA because of their shared interests. The IAEA also doesn't want to create an overly dangerous situation. They've been cooperating with Russia for a long time. For far too long. But the IAEA still doesn't want a nuclear catastrophe in Ukraine. That's probably why the IAEA began pressuring Russia when the power grid situation became truly dangerous for Ukraine's nuclear safety in October-November last year.
Therefore, we can pursue at least two strategies. We must invite other partners, other governments, to expose Russia's lies. It is important that this information be widely disseminated and acknowledged.
- There's another Ukrainian nuclear power plant, infamous worldwide, whose territory is frequently shelled by the Russians, and some damage is even known. It also recently experienced a brief power outage. We're talking, of course, about the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. How would you rate the safety of this plant today?
On February 14th of this year, there was no accident, but a deliberate attack on the New Safe Confinement (NSC) – a special protective structure called "Shelter" at the old No. 4 reactor, where a nuclear disaster occurred in 1986. And then, in February, Russia launched a deliberate, highly targeted attack on the NSC. Perhaps no one planned for the consequences, but they are far-reaching. And in fact, even today, there is no real solution to this problem.
The drone, carrying perhaps 50-90 kilograms of explosives, didn't cause a huge explosion, but it was enough to create a fifty-meter-wide hole. And that's already pretty bad, because it began smoldering throughout the entire structure, primarily in the northern part. And so the entire function of the new confinement was disrupted.
How can this be restored? It's very difficult, because this entire gleaming protective structure, this New Safe Confinement, was built not on top of the shelter, but away from it. And then it was moved into place on enormous rails. Due to high radiation levels, workers couldn't work there for very long. This is a serious problem.
How can we solve it? The first idea that came to mind was this: we should try to return the entire structure to its original location, repair it, and then reinstall it on top. Right now, it seems like this would be very difficult, if not impossible.
Therefore, we currently have no solution to this problem unless we can, for example, expedite the dismantling of the protective structure inside the New Safe Confinement (the old, so-called Sarcophagus, - UNIAN). This dismantling is extremely important. It's a highly radioactive structure—the old "Sarcophagus"—that needs to be dismantled. It can't remain there forever—it's unstable. This can only be done if there's a sealed enclosure around it that prevents the radioactive dust generated during operation from spreading too far. And right now, all of that is under threat. And that's a serious problem.
- If the confinement's integrity is breached, does this mean the situation could pose a danger to people living relatively close to these areas?
Probably not, because that's precisely what the Exclusion Zone exists for. There's debate about whether such a large Exclusion Zone should be maintained, as some parts of it are not heavily contaminated. But the Exclusion Zone's function is also to ensure that, should radiation arise from these operations, the radioactive dust released does not pose a real danger to the population. Therefore, it's likely that this risk to the population is not real.
This could pose a certain risk to workers if the new safe isolation doesn't work. Of course, there's already background contamination in the area. It's not like you're working on a clean slate. It's a contaminated area. But clearly, the purpose of this new safe isolation is to keep the entire area stable so that workers who come there every day have a safe space to work. This is crucial.
- The New Safe Confinement was a large-scale, lengthy, and very expensive project. Are there even rough estimates of how much its restoration might cost Ukraine, our partners, and donors?
Right now, this is just speculation. Perhaps, for example, the EBRD is conducting research and already has a more precise idea. The final cost will depend on the chosen scenario. But we're potentially talking about a huge bill. This is just a guess, but it's likely hundreds of millions of euros for just one cheap Shahed drone. We'll send this bill to Russia. I'm from Belgium. And Euroclear in Brussels has about 190 billion euros in Russian assets. I go through there in Brussels almost every day. Yeah, let's get the money. [Laughs]
- You also studied the aftermath of the Russian occupation of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on the ground. What did you see there when you returned after the occupation? What did they do to the environment and the plant itself?
The Ukrainian authorities invited us to document the war crimes and environmental crimes committed in February and March 2022 during the Russian occupation, in a completely irresponsible manner. And, of course, at the time, a lot of attention was paid to the few trenches the Russians had dug: "Oh no, those poor Russians, they'll come back and get sick" [laughs]. But that wasn't the point. Of course, we went there, and we documented that even those trenches weren't actually heavily contaminated.
- So they didn't dig in in the Red Forest?
Yes. But the main problem we noticed back then was the widespread use of anti-personnel mines. And that's a huge problem. It still hasn't been solved.
Here's just one example. Forest fires occur from time to time, some of them in heavily contaminated areas. And they can release radiation. It's crucial that firefighters go out there and extinguish the fires. They can't be allowed to spread and get out of control. But, of course, this is extremely dangerous for firefighters today. Every step you take effectively puts your life at risk, and you can't clear this vast area of mines. Therefore, this fact has enormous long-term consequences for the management of the entire Exclusion Zone.
There were also thefts—for example, of laboratory equipment from the Ecocenter, sources for calibrating machines... Why did they steal small parts that had no real economic value but to a certain extent impacted the operation of the Ecocenter laboratory? It's unclear.
- There's another potentially dangerous place in Ukraine. Enriched uranium is still stored at the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology. And the city is constantly being shelled by the Russians. What risks does this situation pose?
The radiation levels there are much lower than in a nuclear power plant reactor. The two are incomparable. But it could still lead to some contamination, at least locally. The location and GPS coordinates of this nuclear center are very well known. Therefore, any explosion in this area would be completely irresponsible. In my opinion, this demonstrates Russia's carelessness and irresponsibility in handling anything related to nuclear energy.
- The main leitmotif of our entire interview is the question of how to stop Russia.
My short answer to this is that there are ways. We are not helpless. Ukraine is not helpless. The world is not helpless. I think the main problem is that the international community doesn't support Ukraine clearly enough. Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine has lacked material support. It also lacks political support, especially on the nuclear issue. We have good general statements from all the major political leaders in Europe. But they lack the courage to condemn Russia for its false flag operations, and they lack the pressure on the IAEA to stop supporting Russia.
And, of course, we know why this is happening. For example, France has many joint business projects with Rosatom, and it's deeply sad that there's no clear, 100% clear support for Ukraine. And this is precisely where we must exert greater pressure.
Greenpeace is also campaigning against LNG imports in Belgium, holding non-violent protests. For example, last week we were in Bruges, where Russian liquefied natural gas from Yamal is imported to Europe. We blocked the port for several days to prevent Russian gas from entering the EU gas grid. We truly must stop this. Not in 2027, but now.
And as for nuclear energy, it's even worse. This long-term cooperation between EU countries, France, and even Germany with Rosatom is very cynical.
