From the Obozrevatel:
"A "Special Political Operation" Against Ukraine: Why Trump's Peace Plan Will Start an Even Greater War
Interview with the diplomat Oleh Shamshur
Roman Pryadun, November 25, 2025
- Ukraine and its allies are shocked by the speed with which the White House is pushing through its peace agreement to end the war. The plan generously rewards Putin's aggression, while Ukraine receives a ceasefire and vague American guarantees that Russia will not attack again. Why now, and why in this manner—in the language of an ultimatum?
Firstly, I don't want to sound like a Cassandra; frankly, it's not pleasant at all. But I've said repeatedly that, in my view, despite all of Trump's threats against Putin, despite his criticism or, to be more precise, his demonstrative sanctions, there was still a sense that behind-the-scenes negotiations between Whitkoff, and now, as we understand, Kushner, Trump's son-in-law, and Dmitriev, were ongoing. And what we've seen now is the result of those very contacts. The only question is which of them contributed more, but it seems the basis was drawn from Russian documents.
Why so quickly? One could look for an explanation in the critical situation at the front and the Russian advance. One could look for an explanation in the political crisis in Ukraine caused by the Mindich tapes [a corruption scandal in Ukraine - M. M.]. So, apparently, Witkoff, Dmitriev, and J.D. Vance decided that Ukraine was now at its weakest point. And they decided to give themselves a Thanksgiving present for their boss. Trump's position, however, hasn't changed. We've discussed this repeatedly. His goal is to end the war under any circumstances.
Right now, everyone is focused solely on bringing Putin back to the negotiating table or bringing him there, deliberately avoiding emphasizing that this is strictly a ceasefire. But what will happen next—no one is discussing it. And now, after the announcement of Trump's plan and the European reaction, we see "what will happen next." And frankly, there's nothing favorable for Ukraine in it. So, if we look at how Trump is presenting this and literally pushing it down his throat, it's a classic "Gazov scenario" for "general development." Everything points to him wanting to achieve the desired result as quickly as possible, including so he can implement his megaprojects with Putin and reformat global politics.
If you look at all this more broadly, the worst, most pessimistic expectations are coming true...
- As the Americans point out, the Trump plan remains the basis for a peaceful settlement. The European plan wasn't even seriously considered. In your opinion, what is the main threat to Ukraine from adopting this document in its current form?
The biggest threat is that this is a plan to vassalize Ukraine. If we accept it as it is, it will effectively mean a gradual narrowing of our international legal capacity. This manifests itself in purely formal matters. For example, they're dictating to us what kind of army we should have—reducing our troop numbers. We can argue forever: 600,000 or 700,000, but the very fact of such an imposition is problematic. We're also being told when to hold elections, which is, after all, an internal matter for Ukraine. In short, they're demanding serious, practically existential, concessions from us.
And what concessions is Russia making? Even for the use of frozen Russian state assets, the American plan only stipulates tiny amounts—a pittance compared to needs. Moreover, the US and Russia can use these assets for mutual investments. If we agree on a "de facto" that becomes "de jure," Russia could then say, "Ukraine is a territory we control, so let's keep the money for reconstruction." And then most of the resources will go to areas currently controlled by Moscow. In other words, I don't see any real concessions from Russia.
Moreover, the American version contains a number of formulations that clearly favor Russia. Specifically, the mechanisms for withdrawing from the agreement. The clauses on cultural and linguistic rights and the cessation of "national propaganda" are things that Russia could interpret in its own way and then accuse us of "non-compliance" in order to shirk its obligations. In other words, the logic of the document is extremely pro-Russian.
In short, if you look at this plan, you'll see, among other things, that it's essentially about re-legitimizing Russia. It's as if nothing ever happened. This is a colossal departure from what we heard from our European, not even American, partners in 2022. It's effectively a return to the "law of the jungle." And we can forget about any new European security architecture. As I've already written, the consequence will be a resumption of Russian aggression. The countdown to a pan-European power struggle has already begun—we're already there.
I always remember the consequences of the Franco-Prussian War: the Peace of Westphalia transformed war into a permanent European institution. This is precisely what will result from the implementation of this plan.
- And Trump or the next US president, the same Vance, will say: “You violated – so what help and protection?”
Exactly: in this document, Ukraine and Russia are presented not as equal partners, but as a "great state" and a "small state." The spirit and letter of these proposals, American and European, seem powerless against Russia's systemic approach. Russia will sign, buy time, hide behind negotiations, and have no intention of implementing. This achieves nothing except a semblance of dialogue, which conceals the further strengthening of Moscow's position.
- International media outlets are describing the possible process of its preparation. In fact, Secretary of State Rubio was not involved in the main phase of the development of this plan by Witkoff and Dmitriev, which appears more like a compilation of Russian proposals. And many believe it may have actually been written in the Kremlin, with Witkoff and Kushner merely polishing it up. Trump himself has not gone into detail about the peace plan for resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict, according to the Washington Post. In fact, US congressmen have quoted Rubio as saying that the plan was indeed Russian. But the Secretary of State later retracted these statements.
This could absolutely have been the case. We see that many things are decided precisely this way in this administration. Indeed, it feels like the Kremlin was the one in charge. The document even retains purely Russian wording. It was obviously tweaked a bit to suit Washington. And, obviously, Witkoff, Kushner, J.D. Vance, and people in their circle added their "input." Because there are also points that Russia agreed to with gritted teeth.
But overall, the plan is completely satisfactory for both Russia and the American co-authors, at least given the current situation. Trump's failure to read it closely seems entirely logical. He was confident that it would contain the points that aligned with his vision. After all, the document was drafted by people very close to him—Whitkoff, Kushner, and Vance. He simply delegated it to them, confident that they wouldn't make a single "unnecessary" concession to Ukraine.
- Regarding the guarantees currently being proposed. There's a 28-point peace plan that states that security guarantees will be provided, but without specifics. There's a separate document with three main provisions: in the event of a repeat Russian attack on Ukraine, the US President may use military force or other means deemed appropriate. Second, NATO members will act exclusively in coordination with the US. And third, the maximum term for these guarantees is 10 years. How do you like these security guarantees? There are quite a few pitfalls and vague wording. It seems unlikely they will deter Putin.
In my opinion, the situation is as follows. These 28 points are extremely vague. The first mention of guarantees is simply the phrase "reliable guarantees." Then comes the rather odd "American guarantee," which refers to the possibility of using force. And most importantly, what has already been stated: according to Axios, a separate agreement with Ukraine on guarantees similar to NATO's Article 5 is planned. I compared the wording with Article 5—and I can even say that some elements are better written there. But this doesn't change the difference between the Alliance's collective defense and bilateral promises. And here, you're right, serious pitfalls arise.
First of all, these promises of guarantees contradict the very content of both the American and European texts, which effectively reward Russia without demanding any real concessions. Given Trump's assessment of the situation and his determination to "build a bright future" with Russia, it's highly doubtful he would truly consider any Russian move a "serious threat." It's also doubtful that the Europeans, in this scenario, will come to our rescue, since the key decision rests with the US president.
Putting the formal aspects aside, this seems like a step toward us. But won't these guarantees remain just paper? It can't be that the guarantees are strong, but the text of the agreement is weak, and even contrary to our interests. It doesn't fit. Therefore, we should approach this with great caution.
These are certainly not ironclad guarantees. Moreover, NATO's current behavior toward Russian provocations casts doubt even on the "classic" Article 5. Overall, the situation is complex and not particularly favorable for us.
- So, if you look at American policy in recent years, both Obama and Biden have clearly stated that America will not go to war with Russia. Trump is a different story entirely: it's unclear whether he will fight over NATO, much less over Ukraine.
It's great that you mentioned Obama. Because it was he who first, albeit not very openly, made it clear that Ukraine was not strategically important to the United States, and that Russia would always dominate the region. Biden made a correction, but not a radical one. Trump, however, took this trend to the extreme.
Many may disagree with me, but the main danger of this moment is that we are effectively losing our key strategic partner – because of Trump’s position on Ukraine, the war, and what will happen the next day.
- The Americans insist: ceding territories comes in exchange for security guarantees. This is, as we know, Putin's key demand. Even the US President's Special Representative for Ukraine, Keith Kellogg, stated that difficult decisions would have to be made, and that security guarantees would be provided, but only if the territory was ceded.
The American draft contains a very telling "de facto" clause regarding the recognition of occupied territories. But don't deceive us. If the document is legally binding and still needs to be ratified by the Verkhovna Rada, how can it be considered "de facto"? It's a pure "de jure." In other words, by signing the document, we effectively recognize the Russian occupation of not only Crimea, but also Donetsk and Luhansk. And in return, we receive a "concession" in the form of a demarcation line in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. But this isn't because Putin has suddenly become restrained. He simply can't seize these regions yet.
Almost all military analysts say the demand to abandon the Donetsk region is extremely dangerous. Because even if a "demilitarized zone" were created, we understand perfectly well that within a few days, Russians would already be there, even if unofficially. And there's no mechanism for recording violations. This is no coincidence. And assuming this, it opens up a vast tactical and even strategic foothold—all the way to an offensive on Kyiv. The terrain there is flat, steppe. This plays directly into Putin's hands.
The European document, of course, doesn't contain this odious clause, but it does contain a formula for "exchange of territory." And from the demarcation line. And the demarcation line is where Putin will stop. As for exchange, what exactly? Ukrainian territory for Ukrainian territory under Russia's direction? This isn't just absurd—it's gibberish. The European document is conceptually very similar to the American one. And that's a shame.
- Regarding the Geneva meeting, Ukrainians and Americans expressed optimism on camera. The November 27 deadline seems less pressing, but the key topics—territory, secession from the Donetsk region, and the possibility of joining NATO—have been left for the final meeting between Zelenskyy and Trump. What do you think of the results of that meeting?
With Trump, things are always "interesting": one minute he says the plan isn't final, the next he accuses the Ukrainian leadership of "ingratitude." These emotional swings create uncertainty about where exactly he is on this sine wave.
I could only say that anything significant was "achieved" in Geneva if I had the full package of language. Because we remember 2022, the negotiations in Belarus – there was also cautious optimism then. And now, the optimism is being voiced by those involved in the process themselves. When National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov says that "all Ukrainian wishes have been taken into account," I'm sorry, but that's highly doubtful.
Is Rubio "satisfied"? Perhaps. But he is satisfied with what he got from us... The fog is very thick. It's unclear what was agreed upon, what compromises were reached, and where the "gray areas" are. There won't be complete certainty until we see the final text...
- Regarding Russia, Putin stated that, in principle, the plan was discussed in Alaska and could form the basis of a final peace agreement. Is the Kremlin truly interested in this plan? After all, Russia's main goal is that they "need all of Ukraine"—why leave any troops behind? But it seems Putin is nonetheless interested in this agreement. Yes, he declares that he holds the initiative at the front. But Russia's forces, as many have noted, are still significantly depleted. And next year, the Russian economy and its ability to continue the war will be significantly weaker than even this year. So, the possibility of regrouping is obvious to him, right?
I agree with you. What's in this situation for Putin? You see: it's a repeat of his own policy. Incidentally, the American document itself is essentially consistent with the Anchorage logic. Putin stated at the time that a ceasefire was only possible after the "fundamental points" had been determined. That is, the conditions first.
- In other words, Ukraine must agree to capitulate.
In fact, that's true. What we're being offered is capitulation. There's no need to pretend it's anything else. I fully expect that our negotiators will present this as an "achievement." But it's not an achievement—it's our defeat. How to recover from it is another matter entirely, but that's a separate discussion.
Basically, Putin is pushing this because, despite some successes on the front lines, his progress is very slow, and the losses are colossal. And most importantly, the Russian economy has finally faltered, and American sanctions have come into effect. Therefore, in order to gain a respite and minimize or lift the sanctions altogether, he is launching this scenario through Witkoff, Vance, and everyone else, through Dmitriev, to push this plan.
It's perfectly understandable that he'll press on as much as he can at the front. Because the plan, while not "for now," is advantageous. He'll push ahead as much as possible, using this initiative as a cover. And at the same time, he sees that this plan offers the chance to obtain, without resorting to force, a significant portion of what he would like to achieve through war.
In my opinion, one of the most dangerous aspects is Russia's reintegration into the global economy, its return to the G8, and new economic projects. And, by the way, this isn't just the American version. The Europeans have it, too. Then, admittedly, Merz and Macron declared that there were "no grounds," but the question is: why include this in the plan at all? Is it "no grounds now" or "no grounds ever"?
- For Europeans, the emergence and aggressive promotion of Trump's plan was no less of a shock than for Ukraine. It's clearly dangerous for Europe too. They immediately said: "We'll have an alternative plan," and they did. But why didn't they have one before? Why is there still no mechanism for using Russian assets for the joint benefit of Ukraine and Europe? Why isn't there a fully-fledged defense-industrial complex that's responsible? So what's wrong with Europe? Is it truly in a daze? Because their plan, while more appealing than the American one, seems like no one is seriously considering it. Is that true?
Europe's position is the result of years of development in the security and defense sphere, when everything was outsourced to the Americans. Europeans happily enjoyed the "peace dividend." Plans for rearmament emerged only after the war, and since 2022, it's mostly just talk. This is the result of a chronic European malady: much talk about overcoming the crisis and little action. Both Trump and Putin are acutely aware of this. They are reacting to it in formulating their policies. It is precisely the lack of concrete action, a proactive stance, and endless discussions about the use of Russian assets that have led both Trump and Putin to confidently ignore the Europeans, sidelining them.
If you look at the European plan, you'll see that certain things are worded somewhat differently, even regarding sanctions. But overall, if you read it carefully, it's meaningless. Ukraine, they say, will be "compensated" with frozen assets until Russia "does its part." But how exactly? It seems as vague as everything Europe has been doing with these assets all this time. No radical changes are in sight. Even where some things are better formulated, the document's philosophy is the same as the Americans'. It's a "Trump-Putin plan lite." The essence is the same.
Europeans apparently realize that even radically different ideas, should they arise, will simply be ignored. It's no wonder Marco Rubio said he knew nothing about the plan, but that it's "not that important."
If there were a more active, clear policy, if there were real action, the attitude toward Europe would be different. As it is, the Europeans are reaping the fruits of their own inertia. Their assistance to Ukraine is important. But it seems as if Trump walked in, "turned off the lights," and the situation instantly changed. And this demonstrates Europe's lack of a clear vision, a willingness to take concrete steps, and not just proclaim intentions. If you want to change something, you have to try. And this desire is almost nonexistent in Europe."
