From Novaya Gazeta Europe:
"Why has Russia become the world's bogeyman with a nuclear button?
Explains Yevgeny Savostyanov, the man who tried to reform the KGB and the former deputy head of the presidential administration, who was declared a "foreign agent"
December 5, 2025
Irina Garina
On the last Friday of November, the name of publicist and writer Yevgeny Savostyanov appeared on Russia's register of foreign agents. In the 1990s, he served in the KGB, and not just in the KGB, but as head of the Moscow office. From 1996 to 1999, he was deputy chief of staff to President Yeltsin. Now, the Ministry of Justice has declared Savostyanov not a former KGB officer, but a foreign agent who "spread false information about the decisions of the Russian authorities and opposed military action in Ukraine."
Savostyanov came to the KGB from mining engineering and was one of those who reformed the security services in the early 1990s, attempting to transform them into agencies for the protection of, don't be surprised, human rights. He worked there for only four years, but managed to thoroughly study the typical Chekist. Novaya Evropa asked Yevgeny Savostyanov questions that are rarely asked out loud...
— Yevgeny Vadimovich, given your experience in the KGB, what's it like to be given the title of foreign agent? Does that sound like a spy to you?
Imagine: you're walking through a village, and the village idiot throws a piece of shit at you. So what? You can't hit him. The idiot is a man of God. What can you expect from him?
— You can't really say that the title was bestowed upon you by men of God...
Well, they did... They're just playing the fool. And, by the way, they're disguising themselves.
— Disguising themselves? Why?
It's completely obvious today that Putin himself is a Chinese agent. And his entire retinue, his entire entourage, are Chinese agents. To disguise their role, they're starting to label everyone who isn't with them as a foreign agent. It's like a thief who shouts "Stop thief!" louder than anyone else—a disguise for their own actions...
— They started assigning this status long before Russia became dependent on China. The law was first passed in 2012.
Of course. Disguise is their current practice, but initially, it was simply an element of political repression, the suppression of dissent in the country. Putin, unfortunately, has from the very beginning set a course for lifelong personal rule. This requires, among other things, the suppression of dissent. The foreign agent status was invented to make people absolutely dependent on the state, to deprive them of the opportunity to express alternative opinions. This all sounds painfully familiar.
— By the time they came up with this status, Putin had been in power for 12 years, formally serving his third, but actually fourth, term, and no dissent could stop him. The law was extended to individuals in 2018, when Putin was quietly pursuing his fifth term. What was he afraid of? Who did he decide to defend himself against, and why?
The economic situation in Russia was deteriorating, and Putin understood he was living in a competitive world. And even then, he was preparing for war. Many factors were at play.
It's 2012, Putin has been in power for 11 years. He's clamped down on the entire press, and everything seems calm. But over time, the internet and social media have developed. It turns out that it's easy to clamp down on newspapers and television channels, but not on the internet. They began looking for alternative ways to suppress dissent online. Perhaps the use of the foreign agent designation is a reaction, in particular, to the actions of social media. Moreover, it's part of the preparation for war with the West, so all channels need to be shut down. It's likely that this combination—the development of social media and the intention to start a war—had the greatest impact.
— In 2012, do you think Putin already knew he would start a war with the West?
He started talking about it back in 2007.
— However, in his "Munich speech," he simply said that the West had offended him and didn't love him enough.
Russia was admitted to the G8 in 1997, and under Putin, it remained there by inertia until 2014, until the annexation of Crimea. But the G8 is a club of democracies; no one reigns for life; leaders are replaceable. Putin, who had set a course for lifelong rule, found such a club too small. He realized he had to part ways with the West. Then a kind of cover, a disguise, emerged: we're leaving the West not because I want to rule for life, but because we don't share the same fundamental values. They're all such and such, homosexuals and all that, we'll go our own way. Over time, a new idea emerged: we would lead the Global South in a movement against the West.
— Why such complications? Why couldn't they simply say: comrade Westerners, we're not on the same path, your toilets are gender-neutral, goodbye?
Well, that's what he said, he just needed a motivation. He couldn't say that they don't rule forever, so we're not on the same path. Besides, he and his entire entourage in the West were happy to make money. They needed to find something ideological to distance themselves from. To say that we're different.
— Say to whom? Was it important for Putin to explain this somersault to the West? Or should he have told his own population?
Both. It was primarily aimed at the people, of course. The West was confronted with the fact that Russia wanted to distance itself.
Any dictatorship needs some kind of ideology; without it, it's hard for a dictator to survive. Ideology can generally take one of two forms, or a combination of both. Either people are presented with a glorious future, where the dictator is leading them, as did the communists, as did Hitler, and so on. Or it's a demonstration that enemies are all around, we are forced to defend ourselves, and this can only be done under the leadership of a great leader. Both Stalin and Hitler practiced this, but any dictator loves to exploit it.
Let's put it this way:
When Putin realized he wanted to rule forever, he couldn't offer a coherent scenario for a "bright future" toward which he would lead Russia, severing relations with the West. He still, a quarter-century into his rule, can't articulate such a scenario.
So he chose the second approach: enemies all around. Which means enemies within, too. This is how the concept of foreign agents emerged. Freed from external and internal constraints, Putin embarked on a path to expanding his sphere of dominance. As a result, he attacked Ukraine, intending to inflict a strategic defeat on the West.
In 2013, Putin acquired an ally and like-minded supporter: Xi Jinping, also obsessed with the idea of lifelong rule. I believe this was also a historical revenge, including against Russia, which had seized a significant portion of China's territory in the 19th and 20th centuries. By 2013, China had already significantly surpassed Russia in economic potential, so it became the "big brother" in the relationship. One thing gradually built upon another; it was a complex process.
— There was an episode in 2014 that, I think, has been somewhat forgotten. It was the first days of May 2014, Crimea had already been annexed, referendums on "federalization" had been announced in Donetsk and Luhansk, and then the head of the OSCE and Swiss President Didier Burkhalter arrived in Moscow. After this, Putin abruptly changed his rhetoric and asked his friends in the "DPR" and "LPR" to postpone the referendum, while headlines appeared in the international press about de-escalation in southeastern Ukraine. At the time, there was a rumor that Burkhalter had said or shown Putin something that immediately made him "good," something like holdings in Swiss banks. In June, they met again in Vienna, and the course toward de-escalation continued. It was clear that Putin was trying to avoid confrontation with the West and return to previous relations. But in July 2014, "monkeys with grenades" in Donbas shot down the Malaysian Boeing, and any talk of de-escalation was no longer possible, and Putin simply threw his hat in the ring. Was this truly a turning point? Or did Putin never intend to end the standoff?
Let me tell you what was happening in 2014. Based on his ideology, Putin decided to seize Crimea. After 2008, the economy had been stalling, growth rates had fallen, and Putin's approval ratings had plummeted. The people needed some kind of boost. And they injected him with a gigantic dose of such a boost by seizing Crimea. Meanwhile, Putin launched the Donbas adventure and found himself in conflict with the West. Obama was shouting about how he would impose sanctions that would tear the Russian economy apart.
Putin was prepared for this; he believed he had a backup plan. He flew to China. There, he was supposed to hold negotiations, specifically on the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline. Putin spent a day longer in China than planned, and then, emerging from the talks, declared: our Chinese friends are difficult negotiators, but we've agreed on almost everything: we'll build the pipeline, they'll give us a loan, we'll ensure the sale of Russian gas without any European involvement.
When I heard this, I reacted like this:
Either I don't know the Chinese, or they won't give a penny for the pipeline's construction. A couple of days later, it turned out that China was indeed not providing any loans.
Russia would build the pipeline at its own expense. Then the Chinese even asked Russia for a loan to build their part, the receiving section.
— The Power of Siberia contract with the Chinese was finalized in May 2014. So, by the time he met with Burkhalter, Putin already knew that a great love affair with Beijing wasn't going to happen?
Putin realized that Beijing viewed him as someone in trouble and with no alternative. This meant that the Chinese would squeeze every last drop out of him. Putin found himself in the role of a sucker with no choice, so he was forced to obey. In an attempt to salvage the situation, Putin rushed to Europe for the anniversary of the Normandy landings.
— Let me clarify, this was June 2014. On the 6th, Putin separately discussed a "settlement in Ukraine" with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
In fact, no one was expecting Putin in Normandy anymore; they simply sent him an invitation in advance. No one wanted to meet with him anymore; they kept him on the sidelines, and wouldn't sit at his table, but on his part, it was an attempt to salvage the situation. He realized that by abandoning partnership with the West, he had condemned himself to a secondary role vis-à-vis China.
Then, as you rightly point out, all prospects for any kind of normalization of relations were dashed by the downing of the Malaysia Airlines flight. But Putin never lost hope of salvaging the situation. And back in late 2014, I personally heard one of Russia's leaders asked what a compromise with the West on Ukraine could look like, and he replied, "Crimea is ours, Donbas is yours." In other words, back then, Putin was prepared to give up Donbas if the West recognized Crimea as Russian. He was prepared to exchange Donbas for Crimea.
— So what prevented it? Was Russia ultimately unwilling to "give up" Donbas, or did the West refuse to recognize Crimea?
Recognizing Crimea as Russian is simply impossible. Why was the United Nations created? Summing up the two world wars, world leaders concluded that the worst thing to do in this world was to try to redistribute territories by force. They cited historical precedents, experience, and so on. The UN Charter included a clause stating that redrawing borders by threats and force is unacceptable. And this is a fundamental principle that has since been applied universally throughout the world. You can't name a single country that has annexed another country by force since then. Iraq tried to seize Kuwait, but you remember how that ended.
— What about Turkey and Northern Cyprus?
Turkey does not recognize Northern Cyprus as part of its territory. Armenia did not recognize Karabakh as part of its territory. Because the international universal principle applies.
Why is Putin now seeking legal recognition of the territories seized by Russia by the US and Europe? Because that would make the US and Europe Putin's accomplices in the destruction of the fundamental foundations of the modern world order, the UN Charter. If anyone were to sign on to the legal recognition of this "annexation," it would mean that seizing territory by force would now be legal. That would end the world order that existed since 1945.
— So, in 2014, Putin still hadn't made friends with China, but had already fallen out with the West, feeling like he was in limbo?
Not quite. You can only make friends with China if you have an alternative. I've negotiated with the Chinese, and I understand perfectly well how they behave when they know they have a competitor. And I know what the Chinese are like when they know they have no competitor. Putin can't make friends with China if he doesn't have an alternative in the West. Do you understand?
— So without friendship with the West, there can be no friendship with China either?
Such "friendship" with China can only be vassal-like. And Putin understood this. He saw that the Chinese, while seemingly friends, were treating him... They smiled, they offered him tea, but they squeezed everything out of him. They kept pushing and pushing, refusing to make any concessions, and twisting everything to their own advantage. Putin realized that the only way to avoid this was to show the Chinese that there was an alternative. "We can sell gas to Europe, too," he said. But after the events of 2014, Putin had already begun to fall into a state of uncontested dependence on China.
— But until the summer of 2021, Europe was buying Russian gas just fine. It would have continued buying it if Gazprom hadn't resorted to gas blackmail back then. How could Putin decide to do this if he also needed the European market as an argument in negotiations with the Chinese? There was no war yet, and he'd already cancelled trade with the EU?
This is just another one of his stupidities.
— Just stupidity? Maybe there was some subtle calculation we can't understand?
It's his way of thinking. Remember what General Lebed said about them? They're not fools, they're just thinking this way.
— What exactly is Putin's way of thinking? I don't know how former KGB agents think; I can only classify him as the type of person accustomed to achieving love through rape.
That's about right. He's the kind of person who believes: if they don't give in, you have to push harder. If they don't give in, you have to push even harder. Sooner or later, you'll crush them.
— But he did crush them. Remember how often Putin's fans repeated that he "outplayed everyone again"?
Until 2021, he was actually successful. But in 2021, people stopped fearing him.
— Why? What happened that made people stop fearing him?
Maybe Europe is simply psychologically tired of constantly wondering what Putin will do next. When you're constantly being blackmailed, at some point you decide not to give in to it anymore.
In the fall of 2021, Angela Merkel, one of the proponents of such a capitulatory stance toward Russia, left politics. New political leaders began to emerge. Those who were determined to befriend Putin at all costs, such as Nicolas Sarkozy or Silvio Berlusconi, disappeared. In their place, new people emerged who saw Putin's mug, not his face. They adopted a tougher stance toward Russia.
Since 2021, the West has stopped backing down from Putin's demands. And then, Russia's behavior became increasingly absurd. When Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in January 2022 that NATO should "pack its bags," everyone just laughed. He was already saying this to people who weren't even thinking about packing their bags.
— Do you think this started in 2021? And not earlier, when Joseph Biden became president of the United States and openly called Putin a murderer?
I don't think so, and Biden said that only in March 2021.
— Biden knew Russia well, and it seemed to me he was the first in the West to talk to Putin the way you'd talk to a thug: coldly, harshly, without concessions or hysterics. Putin a murderer? Yes, he is.
Yes, but then Biden met with Putin; they even shook hands.
— In June 2021. Then, do you think Biden mishandled Putin?
Unfortunately, mishandled him. How did Biden act when it became clear that Putin was preparing to attack Ukraine in 2022?
— He said something to the effect that an American soldier would never set foot in Ukraine. Was that a key mistake?
If you examine all of this sequentially, you see: the US holds one meeting, then a second, a third, a fourth, discussing one response to an invasion of Ukraine, then a second, a third... The only thing they don't discuss is how to prevent the invasion. And ultimately, this series of meetings culminates with Biden articulating three objectives for American policy regarding a future Russian invasion of Ukraine: the US must preserve Ukraine's sovereignty, it must preserve NATO, and it must prevent World War III.
And the third constraint played a particularly fatal role:
As soon as Putin threatened to press the nuclear button, CIA Director William Burns rushed to Moscow to negotiate concessions to keep Putin from pressing the button. And Biden backed down.
Then, quietly, bit by bit, penny by penny, Biden finally gave something to Ukraine. But the speed and quality of American supplies suffered greatly. If Biden had done everything he did in May 2022, what he did just days before leaving office, the situation would have been completely different. Biden's entire policy toward Putin has been extremely cautious. Too cautious.
But now we see that almost four years have passed. Ukraine has retained its sovereignty, NATO remains intact, and there is no world war. In this sense, Biden's strategic goals have been achieved. Putin's aim of dismantling Ukrainian statehood, however, has not been achieved. This means that Putin has already suffered a defeat.
— The European Union is a huge economy, not much poorer than the United States, based on GDP. How did it happen that Europe was almost completely dependent on Russia for energy resources, and on the United States for defense? Why is such a powerful alliance of countries so, as it turns out, such a bungler?
When the Cold War ended, people with the mentality of mayors, city council members, and social workers came to power in European countries. That is, people who were elected for promising to clean up the roads, the air, and the rivers.
— But that's good, isn't it?
That's good, but only if it doesn't come at the expense of defense capability. A state's top priority should be security. Not profit, not clean streets, not "green energy," but security. Especially when you're dealing with a country like Russia."
The EU should have finally realized this in 2011, when Russia adopted its rearmament program. Of course, it was thought that this program was designed to fight Chechen terrorists, the Taliban, and so on. But, roughly speaking, the strategic bombers, submarines, and intercontinental missiles they were talking about aren't quite suitable for that, are they? At that point, the EU should have realized: that's it, folks, we're entering a new era of confrontation.
In 2018, Donald Trump told the Europeans this point-blank: they needed to increase military spending and take responsibility for their own security. They never did this until the very end of the Biden administration. Only towards the very end, after Trump had won the election, did they begin to make a fuss.
— So I'm asking: why is this so?
It's total carelessness. And not on the part of the elites, but on the part of the people in Europe. Because it was the people who elected those who said: we shouldn't spend money on weapons, we should reduce the army, we should disband them, and so on. Those who cut defense spending, who closed nuclear power plants and built wind turbines, won the elections. Let China produce industrial goods, let Russia supply energy, and at least we'll have clean air.
As a result, they've become dependent on China for industrial production and on the United States for security. This carelessness has now forced Europe to radically tighten its economy in the interests of defense. If they had spent at least 2% of GDP on weapons all these years, if they had cared about building proper armies, it would have been quite easy for them now. But in the end, it's a truly enormous burden.
— You said something I didn't expect to hear from you: security should come first. Isn't that more Putin's logic? When you were reforming the security services in the new Russia, it was believed that freedom, human rights, and prosperity came first, followed by security. Is that your experience as a former KGB officer? Or are you referring to some specific kind of security?
Freedom, human rights, and prosperity are good things. Freedom should generally come first, when it comes to a country's domestic affairs. But in international relations, we must understand: if a neighbor starts frantically rearming, consider whether they're planning to come to you with those weapons. Where did Russia plan to use the tanks, planes, and submarines envisaged by its rearmament program?
— Russia didn't really hide it after 2012: NATO is a potential enemy.
They started talking about it around 2014, and before that, such things weren't announced. But Russia's neighbors should have wondered why it was rearming. And that was more important than even clean streets and clean air.
— Both you and many other analysts attribute all of Putin's actions to a desire to rule for life. I can't agree with that, because I don't understand why a man who's already achieved everything and has everything would do that. I think some ideas, already brewing in his head, must be at play here. You probably find it easier to understand a KGB agent? Why would he want to rule for life?
Well, first of all, it gives him a sense of security. He's afraid that if he leaves power, he'll be held accountable for a lot. And I think he's right about that, by the way. Secondly... Well, listen, when you already have everything, everyone tiptoes around you, and you start to like it. Such a person enjoys watching everyone ultimately become his slaves; everyone living in Russia is his slave, they have no rights.
This appeals to a person who is not very developed, burdened, apparently, since childhood by some complexes—poverty, dependence, and so on. A person of low culture, a shallow mind. All this combines to make the person enjoy being an alpha male, to whom everyone grovels.
— Was this a professional deformation of someone who worked in the KGB, or did people with such personal qualities join the KGB?
I wouldn't say there was any professional deformation here. The KGB selected people with specific qualities.
— He, I believe, said he wanted to work there since childhood.
In any case, a certain kind of person came there. And then the "enemies all around" ideology was imposed on them. It's important to understand that there was a certain difference between those who worked in intelligence and those who worked in counterintelligence. The former were automatically imbued with the imperial spirit: working abroad, expanding influence, global impact, and so on. Counterintelligence officers, on the contrary, were nationalists: we need a fortress the enemy can't penetrate...
In Russia, everything was his. Well, that's it. But then it was not enough for him. In Russia, everyone was tiptoeing around him, but Europe was looking down on him. He needed to make them tiptoe too...
Xi Jinping could stop Putin. But I think that for the next two years, Beijing will remain indifferent to the war in Ukraine, and even support Russia because China benefits from this war. But in two years, when Europe has the opportunity to negotiate with China from a position of strength, something might begin to change."
