Tranlating from Faktor:
"Kwasniewski: Putin will go down in history as the father of Ukrainian national identity
"To be precise, I was surprised by the fact that someone in Moscow thought and still decided to make an obviously tragic mistake, because Putin is an experienced politician - he spent 23 years at the head of the Russian Federation before the invasion. When I was initially asked for predictions, I said that the conflict would last for several years, but that Ukrainian-Russian hatred would last for generations." This was stated by former Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski to Radar.
“What did not surprise me was Putin’s intention. For example, we met in the Kremlin in 2002, and when I asked him as a more experienced colleague what his goals were, he replied that he wanted to ‘restore a great Russia.’ Anyone who knows the past knows that this is impossible without control over Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus and Central Asian states,” he explained.
He pointed out that Western intelligence agencies knew about the aggression. “Their intelligence officers knew and warned. Russian troops were massing on the border, and Putin himself had given a provocative speech ten days earlier, full of forgeries and lies, which contained language similar to that used by Molotov after the signing of the Ribbentrop Pact and the division of Poland between the USSR and Nazi Germany. Brezhnev spoke in a similar way before the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. I even remember his words – I was 14 years old. I was not surprised by Putin’s intention, but by the method because he had other means at his disposal.
Establishing soft power control may take longer, but it is not as if the Russian president does not have time. It has long been clear that he does not limit his term to four or five years. He could spread influence through language, cultural ties, economics and investments, and even through different political representatives…” – explained Kwasniewski, adding: “If Putin’s intention was to support someone in Ukrainian political life, he should have chosen more intelligent and less corrupt candidates.
Moreover, in 2004, voters did not revolt against Viktor Yanukovych as such, but against voter intimidation and election theft. The peaceful resolution of the Orange Revolution was important for both sides. Ukrainians realized that it made sense to fight for basic democratic principles. This struggle led them even deeper into Westernization, but never to the end.
On the other hand, Putin saw that the post-Soviet states could “break away” from Moscow and develop mechanisms that would make his type of rule more difficult in the long run. Remember, in 2004 Putin was a relatively young president and did not have such a strong grip on power in Russia. I believe he learned his lessons much better than the leaders of the Orange Revolution. He planned in detail to prevent further “Westernization” of Ukraine and the possibility of a Maidan in Moscow or St. Petersburg.
On the other hand, Ukraine’s pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko were constantly at odds and clearly did not benefit from Euro-Atlantic prospects. Who knows – if they had acted more decisively twenty years ago, Putin might have had to agree to Ukraine’s membership in the EU and NATO. We all easily forget how differently things were arranged…”
When asked if Putin had changed his priorities, the former Polish president replied:
“That lasted for a short time – until 2005, when I finished my second presidential term. But I’ll tell you what Leonid Kuchma, the former president of Ukraine, who knows the president of Russia better than I do, once told me. The possibility of an invasion was hanging in the air, everyone was talking about it, and when I asked him if it would happen, he said: ‘Yes. Whatever it is, Putin certainly doesn’t want to be remembered as another Hitler.’ And what did he get in return? That some future historian would cite him as one of the main fathers of Ukrainian national identity.”"
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